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University of Leeds 
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1. Introduction 
Beliefs that locate you in space or time are self-locating beliefs. These cause a problem for Bayesian 
models of belief. Miriam Schoenfield (2016) offers a solution – that on learning x, agents should 
update on the fact that they learned x. I will argue that Schoenfield’s suggestion does not solve the 
problem. 
 
2. Background: Conditionalization and Self-Locating Belief 
Let’s start with the Bayesian picture of belief update. Imagine all the possible worlds spread out across 
logical space. Each has some initial probability. When you learn E, all the not E possibilities are 
eliminated, and their probabilities are distributed across the remaining E possibilities. This process of 
eliminating false possibilities and zooming in on the one true world continues until, at the limit of 
enquiry, when omniscience is reached, there is only one possibility remaining – the one true world 
has all the credence and there is no more learning to be done. 
 But now consider a self-locating belief such as today is Sunday. Suppose you acquire 
omniscience on a Sunday, and so believe that it is Sunday. The problem is that if you stick with this 
belief for 24 hours you believe falsely – it’s now Monday but you falsely believe it’s Sunday. If you 
want to stay omniscient you need to give up the belief that it’s Sunday and acquire the belief that it’s 
Monday. But traditional Bayesianism simply doesn’t have a mechanism for this kind of belief update. 
The problem is that self-locating facts are a moving target. There is no one true world to zoom in on. 
Instead, the true world is a Sunday world, then a Monday world, then a Tuesday world… 
 To put the point formally, the standard model of belief update for Bayesians is 
conditionalization: 
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Conditionalization: If an agent learns E and nothing else between t0 and t1 then 
P1(.) = P0(.|E) 
 
Now consider a self-locating belief such as today is Sunday. You might be certain that it is Sunday, then 
hear the clock has struck midnight, meaning it’s now Monday. Conditionalization seems to imply that 
you should believe that it is Monday, and maintain your belief that it is Sunday i.e. believe it is Sunday 
and Monday. But clearly this is not what you should believe. 
 This suggests that the problem is due to certainty, and that we might solve it by adopting a 
model in which agents are never certain. But certainty is not essential to the problem.1 The core of 
the problem is that self-locating beliefs can be true at one time and false at a later time (and vice 
versa); yet the Bayesian model is that of agents eliminating possibilities and zooming in on the truth.  
 Miriam Schoenfield (2018) defends an alternative to conditionalization and argues that it 
solves the problem of self-locating belief. I will argue that it cannot solve the problem. 
 
3. Schoenfield’s Theory  
Here is Schoenfield’s suggestion (we grant with Schoenfield that one should maximize expected 
accuracy): 
 
I will now argue that conditionalizing on self-locating evidence doesn’t in general 
maximize expected accuracy in cases of belief discovery2…I will show that the 
update procedure that does, in general, maximize expected accuracy in cases of 
                                                          
1 See Hedden (2015 p.37-40) 
2 Schoenfield holds that the reason they shouldn’t conditionalize on self-locating belief is that ‘Factivity’ 
doesn’t hold i.e. the agent shouldn’t conditionalize because the agent is not certain at t0 that if she learns E 
upon undergoing her future learning experience [at t1], then E is true at t0. But this means it’s not a case of 
Discovery (see Bradley 2011a p.395); Discovery says that the agent is certain that the truth-value of E does not 
change over the period of interest. I maintain that in cases of belief Discovery, conditionalizing on self-locating 
evidence does maximize expected accuracy; if Factivity fails then it is not a case of Discovery. 
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self-locating evidence is not conditionalization, but what I will call 
conditionalization* [the update procedure that has us adopt p(.|L(Xi)), upon 
learning Xi]. (Schoenfield 2018 p.702) 
 
Generalized CondMax: Suppose that you are certain that you are going to learn 
exactly one proposition from a set of propositions, X, at time t. Let L(Xi) be the 
proposition that Xi is learned upon undergoing the learning experience at t. The 
update-procedure that maximizes expected accuracy in response to X, relative to 
probability function p, is the update-procedure that assigns, to each Xi, P(.|L(Xi)). 
(Schoenfield 2018 p.703)3 
 
Schoenfield isn’t explicit about whether L(Xi) is intended to be a self-locating proposition or a non-
self-locating proposition. Is it the self-locating proposition that Xi is learnt now, or is it the non-self-
locating proposition that Xi is learnt at some time? Either way, it seems to run into a problem, so my 
challenge takes the form of a dilemma.   
 
4. First horn: L(Xi) is self-locating 
On the first horn, suppose L(Xi) is self-locating. This horn fails to avoid the original problems caused 
by self-locating beliefs. Consider an agent who is certain that it is Sunday and then acquires the belief 
that it is Monday as time passes. Then Xi = Today is Monday. The original problem was that 
conditionalizing on ‘Today is Monday’ results in the agent absurdly believing ‘Today is Sunday and 
today is Monday’; the earlier belief that today is Sunday has not gone away. On Schoenfield’s account 
the agent should not conditionalize on ‘Today is Monday’ – they should conditionalize on ‘That today 
                                                          
3 This is developed in Schoenfield 2017. I agree with much of what Schoenfield says, but I think that in trying to 
solve the problem of self-locating beliefs she overreaches. 
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is Monday is learned’. And to make explicit that this is self-locating, we can put it as ‘That today is 
Monday is learned today’.   
 But this doesn’t address the problem. The agent can trivially infer from ‘That today is Monday 
is learned today’ that today is Monday, and is once again left with the absurd belief that it is Sunday 
and Monday. The agent’s earlier belief that today is Sunday has not gone away. The absurd result that 
they believe ‘today is Sunday and today is Monday’ remains. 
  
5. Second horn: L(Xi) is non-self-locating 
On the second horn, suppose L(Xi) is non-self-locating. This means the procedure Schoenfield 
recommends is to conditionalize on the non-self-locating proposition that Xi is learnt at some time. 
But there are cases where conditionalizing on only non-self-locating propositions gives the wrong 
answer. Indeed, Schoenfield herself explains the point with the following case:  
 
FAIRIES AND DEMONS: Sleeping Beauty is going to be awoken and put back to 
sleep ten times, beginning on Monday morning. After each awakening, she will 
encounter either a friendly fairy or an evil demon and then her memory of the 
awakening will be erased before she is put back to sleep. How many fairies or 
demons she will see will be determined by whether she was blessed or cursed at 
the time of her birth. If she was blessed, she’ll see a friendly fairy on nine days 
and an evil demon on one day, but if she was cursed she’ll see an evil demon on 
nine days and a friendly fairy on one day. Beauty knows all of this before going to 
sleep and her initial credence that she was blessed at the time of her birth is 0.5. 
(Schoenfield 2018 p.700) 
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Schoenfield agrees that seeing a fairy confirms that Beauty is blessed (and seeing a demon confirms 
that Beauty is cursed). Obtaining such confirmation is a desired result of any analysis. And Schoenfield 
concedes that:  
 
[conditionalizing on non-self-locating] propositions like Beauty sees a fairy on one 
of the awakenings…won’t yield the desired result. Since Beauty is certain 
that…she will see a fairy on one of the awakenings, that she sees a friendly fairy 
on one of the awakenings provides no evidence either for being blessed or for 
being cursed. (Schoenfield 2018 p.701) 
 
And Schoenfield cannot deliver the desired result. This horn allows Beauty to conditionalize only on 
something like the non-self-locating ‘Beauty learns that she sees a fairy on one of the awakenings’, 
which fails to confirm that she is blessed. To get the desired result, Beauty needs to conditionalize on 
a self-locating piece of evidence such as ‘I see a fairy today’. But self-locating evidence takes us back 
to the first horn of the dilemma. So Generalized CondMax does not avoid the original problem with 
self-locating evidence. 
  
6. Schoenfieldian Response? 
A referee suggests a response: 
 
Schoenfield may have a response along the following lines:  The view is that L(X) 
is a non-self-locating proposition of the form "I learn X at time t". t can refer to a 
time demonstratively.  In the Fairies and Demons case, even if I don't know what 
day it is when I wake up, before discovering whether there's a fairy or demon, I 
can name the time at which I will learn this information - say I name it "t".  It's 
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true, then, that prior to seeing the fairy on that particular day, Pr(I was blessed|I 
see a fairy at time t) = 0.9.4  
 
This is a tempting thought but I don’t think it can work. Conditionalization requires that the same 
proposition which was uncertain at the earlier time is learnt at the later time. And there doesn’t seem 
to be any reading of ‘t’ which allows this.  
 Suppose ‘t’ refers demonstratively, as the referee suggests, so the proposition is ‘I learn that 
I see a fairy on this day’. The problem is that when uttered on earlier days, ‘this day’ refers to a 
different day. On Sunday, Pr(I was blessed | I learn that I see a fairy on this day) = 0.5, as ‘t’ refers to 
Sunday, and seeing a fairy on Sunday is not relevant to being blessed or cursed. So conditionalizing on 
‘I learn that I see a fairy on this day’ gives the wrong answer.5  
 Suppose ‘t’ means ‘whatever day, if any, that a fairy is seen’. But then the proposition learnt 
follows from the description of the case, so Pr(I learn that I see a fairy whatever day, if any, that a fairy 
is seen) = 1, and this cannot confirm anything.  So I don’t think the referee’s response can work.6 
  
7. Conclusion 
Schoenfield argues that updating on ‘I learn E’ solves the problem of self-locating evidence. I argued 
that ‘I learn E’ must be either self-locating or not, and in each case fails to solve the problem.7  
 So where does Schoenfield’s argument for Generalized CondMax go wrong? Her argument (in 
her 2018 appendix 2) is based on Greaves and Wallace’s (2006) argument for conditionalization, but 
                                                          
4 This is related to Titelbaum’s (2008) theory. For elaboration on my response see Bradley (2011b p.333-5). 
5 We do get the right answer regarding the shift from being woken on one of the days to seeing a fairy on that 
same day, but this is because no self-locating proposition has changed truth-value over that period. We still 
need a theory for how beliefs should change between one day and the next. 
6 Perhaps we can get the desired result with ‘I see a fairy on a randomly selected day’. But if so, we won’t need 
Schoenfield’s distinction between ‘X’ and ‘I learn X’. And it won’t solve the general problems such as moving 
from ‘it’s Sunday’ to ‘it’s Monday’. 
7 I am grateful to Miriam Schoenfield for helpful discussion and comments on an earlier draft. 
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Greaves and Wallace do not consider self-locating evidence. So self-locating evidence seems to 
introduce complexities that are not taken into account in Schoenfield’s discussion. 
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